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Abstract
Economic reform in the transition economies of the former Soviet bloc has trans-
formed the volume and mix of these economies’ agricultural production, consump-
tion, and trade. Output drops in most countries have ranged from 25 to 50 percent.
The livestock sector has been hit particularly hard, all but eliminating U.S. grain
exports to the region.  This report concludes that the output decline has been an
inevitable part of market reform and that the main goal of agricultural policy in the
transition economies should not be to return output to pre-reform levels but to
increase the productivity of input use.  Although reform has created a food security
problem in some countries, the cause of the problem is not insufficient food sup-
plies, but rather inadequate access to food by segments of the population and
regions within countries.
Keywords: Russia, Ukraine, former Soviet Union, Central and Eastern European
countries, transition economies, agricultural production, livestock sector, food con-
sumption, trade, policy reform, productivity.
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Summary
Economic reform in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe and
the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former USSR has transformed the vol-
ume and mix of these countries’ agricultural production, consumption, and trade.
The main development has been the drop in output, ranging in most countries from
25 to 50 percent, the livestock sector being hit particularly hard.
The fall in agricultural production, along with the accompanying decline in food
consumption, affects U.S. agricultural and policy interests vis-à-vis the transition
economies in three areas: policy-advising/technical assistance, food security and
aid, and agricultural trade. A conceptual framework based on supply and demand
analysis is used to examine how reform has changed agricultural production, con-
sumption, and trade in the transition economies, with an emphasis on explaining
the decline in output. Conclusions are then drawn concerning the above areas of
U.S. policy interest. Key findings include:
The drop in agricultural production has been an inevitable part of market reform.
Most government officials and agricultural interests in the transition region argue
that the downsizing of agriculture during reform has had a devastating effect on the
region. They contend that the main goal of government policy and Western techni-
cal assistance in agriculture should be to revive production. Western press accounts
also tend to assess the reform-driven drop in output in negative terms. This report
shows that large direct and indirect subsidies in the pre-reform period helped to
maintain artificially high levels of production and consumption. Reduction of the
subsidies inevitably reduced these bloated volumes.
The absence of a decline in output in a country more likely reflects failure to
reform, rather than reform success. The countries that have experienced the lowest
declines in agricultural output, such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, have also
been the least reformist.
The food security problem in transition economies is not inadequate availability of
food supplies, but insufficient access to food by segments of the population and
regions within countries. Before reform, the transition economies had high per
capita levels of consumption of most foodstuffs, compared even with wealthy
Western countries. Although consumption of high-value livestock products has
fallen during reform, consumption of staple foods, such as bread and potatoes, has
remained steady or even increased. This shows that overall food supplies have
been adequate. Food insecurity has increased because the growth in poverty during
transition has expanded the size of the population that cannot afford a healthy diet,
and because impediments to the internal flow of foodstuffs within certain countries
have prevented deficit-producing regions from obtaining food supplies.
The main goal of agricultural reform should not be to increase output but rather to
raise productivity and reduce production costs. By lowering production costs, pro-
ductivity growth will make domestic output more price competitive on the world
market. Productivity growth not only raises a country’s productive capacity, but
also provides flexibility as to how the country uses the increased capacity. In many
transition economies, productivity growth in agriculture will benefit the economy
most not by expanding the output of agricultural goods, but rather by allowingiv  Changes in Agricultural Markets in Transition Economies / AER-806 Economic Research Service/USDA
resources to be shifted to producing other goods that either are more desired by
consumers or are more competitive on the world market.
The loss of the former USSR as a large market for U.S. animal feed is a permanent
consequence of reform. The contraction of the region’s livestock sector has elimi-
nated the need for large imports of feed grain, soybeans, and soybean meal from
the United States and other Western countries. On the other hand, the NIS region
has become a big importer of meat, particularly poultry from the United States.
The shift from importing animal feed to maintain a large livestock sector to
importing meat and other livestock products is consistent with the region’s com-
parative advantage in agricultural goods—that is, the region produces livestock
goods at a relatively higher cost than it produces animal feed.Economic Research Service/USDA Changes in Agricultural Markets in Transition Economies / AER-806  1
Introduction
The Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs)
and Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former
USSR began major market-oriented reform of their
economies in the late 1980s and early 1990s.1 Eco-
nomic reform has transformed the structure and vol-
ume of these countries’ agricultural production, con-
sumption, and trade. The dominant development
throughout the region is that output has fallen. By the
late 1990s, in every transition economy agricultural
production was below pre-reform levels, the drop in
most countries being in the range of 25 to 50 percent.
The contraction has been particularly strong in the
livestock sector, with animal herds and livestock pro-
duction down by about half.
Most agricultural interests in the transition economies
view the contraction of agriculture in general, and the
livestock sector in particular, as a catastrophe, and
argue that reviving output should be a top priority of
government policy. Most Western press accounts of
transition agriculture during the last decade have
painted the reform-driven decline in production in neg-
ative terms, using it as an indicator of the many trou-
bles plaguing the sector. The fall in food consumption
that has accompanied the drop in output has raised
concerns over food security, particularly in Russia and
other NIS countries.
Because the severe decline in output has been the key
“fact” concerning agriculture’s experience during the
transition period, and has evoked so much concern,
understanding why output has fallen is crucial in deter-
mining the nature of the problems facing the sector and
the appropriate policy response. In particular, it is
essential that the agricultural establishments in the tran-
sition economies and Western bodies providing policy
advice and technical assistance (national governments,
international organizations, private voluntary organiza-
tions) agree on the explanations of the main reform
developments (or facts), particularly the contraction of
output. Also, Western forecasting studies underesti-
mated the extent to which agricultural output would fall
during the transition period. Understanding why the
underprediction occurred can help identify problems
that were unanticipated or underappreciated at the start
of reform and may therefore deserve more attention.
Some publications during the 1990s monitored the
contraction of agriculture in the transition economies,
examples being the annual reports on transition agri-
culture by the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) and Economic Research
Service (ERS).2 These studies appropriately explain
the contraction as the natural consequence of policies
and market responses that are necessary pieces of the
reform process. The analysis, however, is in rather
general terms. Jackson and Swinnen (1995) and
Macours and Swinnen (2000a) more explicitly exam-
ine the causes of agricultural output decline, with
Macours and Swinnen quantitatively measuring the
contribution of various factors to the CEECs’ drop in
production in the first half of the 1990s. This ERS
study is the first to develop and use a conceptual
framework based on supply and demand analysis to
analyze how market reform has changed agricultural
production, consumption, and trade, with an emphasis
on output contraction.
This study has four key objectives: (1) to explain how
and why the transition has changed the structure of
agricultural production, consumption, and trade; (2) to
identify why Western forecasting studies underesti-
mated the production decline; (3) to examine the conse-
quences of commodity restructuring for food security;
and (4) to examine output versus productivity growth
as competing performance indicators of agricultural
reform.
Changes in Agricultural Markets 
in Transition Economies
William Liefert and Johan Swinnen
1 The reforming CEECs include Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic,
Slovak Republic, Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Slovenia, Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia.  The NIS include
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. 2 The latest publications of each are OECD (2001) and ERS (1998).2  Changes in Agricultural Markets in Transition Economies / AER-806 Economic Research Service/USDA
Main Elements of 
Agricultural Reform in 
Transition Economies
Reform of the agricultural and food systems of the
transition economies has involved four main elements:
(1) market liberalization, (2) farm restructuring, (3)
reform of upstream and downstream operations, and
(4) the creation of supporting market infrastructure.
Market liberalization involves removing government
controls over the allocation of resources and output,
thereby allowing the market to become the main
means of allocation. It includes the key reform policies
of liberalizing prices and trade and eliminating subsi-
dies to agricultural producers and consumers. By
changing prices, incomes, and other key monetary val-
ues that influence the market decisions of producers
and consumers, market liberalization has substantially
altered the volume and mix of countries’ agricultural
production, consumption, and trade. Liberalization and
its effects thereby mainly address the question of what
goods are produced and consumed in the agricultural
economy. Market liberalization also links the macro-
economy to agriculture. Macro developments, such as
inflation and movement in the exchange rate, affect the
key variables (prices, consumer income) that drive
agricultural markets.
Farm restructuring changes the nature or system of
production at the level of the actual producer. It
involves how farms are owned, organized, and man-
aged—that is, how goods are produced. Key policies
of farm restructuring are privatization and land reform,
which directly affect incentives for using labor and
other resource inputs.
The difference between market liberalization and farm
restructuring in terms of their effect on output and
consumption is as follows. Market liberalization
changes the mix of goods produced, as well as how
goods are distributed, in a way that better satisfies con-
sumers’ desires for goods.  Farm restructuring entails
changes by producers that could increase productivity.
This would allow more output to be produced from a
given amount of input, which would increase the total
quantity of goods available for consumption.
Market liberalization and farm restructuring are inter-
related, in that market liberalization can help motivate
farm restructuring. The desire to increase profit, or
fighting just to stay in business, can spur producers to
reduce costs by changing their system of production.
The pressures from market competition are the key to
the relationship between the two elements of reform.
Market liberalization by itself, however, will not
inevitably lead to farm restructuring—producers must
still make the actual changes in how they produce.
Reform of upstream and downstream operations
(upstream activities involve the supplying of agricul-
tural inputs, while downstream activities involve stor-
age, transportation, processing, and distribution) would
turn the previously state-run enterprises and systems
responsible for these matters into market-oriented and
competitive enterprises. Such reform could improve
the productivity and performance not only of the sup-
pliers of upstream and downstream goods and serv-
ices, but also of the farms they serve.
The creation of supporting market infrastructure
entails establishing the institutions and services,
whether commercially or publicly provided, that a
well-functioning, market-oriented agricultural econ-
omy needs. This infrastructure includes systems of
agricultural banking and finance, market information,
and commercial law that can clarify and protect prop-
erty, enforce contracts, and resolve disputes. Develop-
ment of market infrastructure and the transformation
of upstream and downstream operations are closely
related, and, in some respects, hard to separate. For
example, in many isolated regions of countries, the
collapse of the planned economy has deprived farms
(especially small ones) of any channels for obtaining
inputs, or for selling, storing, or processing output. In
other words, upstream and downstream linkages, as
well as the market infrastructure (such as market infor-
mation) that could allow farms to find new linkages,
are completely lacking.
The four elements of agricultural reform identified in
this report are roughly comparable to the taxonomy of
reform elements for transition agriculture by the World
Bank (Csaki and Nash, 2000): (1) price and market
liberalization, (2) land reform and privatization, (3)
privatization and reform of agroprocessing and input
supply enterprises, (4) rural finance, and (5) institu-
tional reforms.  Market liberalization corresponds to
WB element #1, farm restructuring to WB element #2,
reform of upstream and downstream operations to WB
element #3, and market infrastructure to WB elements
#4 and #5.Economic Research Service/USDA Changes in Agricultural Markets in Transition Economies / AER-806  3
The World Bank report not only identifies the main
elements of agricultural reform, but also grades the
agricultural reform effort in all transition economies
with respect to its five reform elements. Unlike the
World Bank study, the focus of this ERS report is not
on determining which transition economies have per-
formed better in agricultural reform, and why they
have done better. Rather, this report focuses on identi-
fying the agricultural reform experiences and problems
that have been most common to all transition
economies.
Nonetheless, it should be kept in mind that the reform
experience and progress of countries have differed.
The CEECs (including the Baltic States) have gener-
ally reformed faster and more successfully than their
NIS counterparts. In the World Bank grading system,
out of a maximum total score of 10, Hungary (8.8)
and the Czech Republic (8.6) lead all countries, fol-
lowed by Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia, and Poland. Rus-
sia and Ukraine receive scores of 5.6 and 5.4. The
lowest scores go to Turkmenistan (2.0), Uzbekistan
(2.0), and Belarus (1.8). (The differing reform
progress of countries, particularly as reflected by pro-
ductivity growth, is discussed later in this ERS
report.) The problems of transition agriculture exam-
ined in this report therefore hold more strongly for the
NIS countries than for the CEECs. 4  Changes in Agricultural Markets in Transition Economies / AER-806 Economic Research Service/USDA
How Reform Has Changed 
Agricultural Production, 
Consumption, and Trade
Since reform began in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
agriculture in most transition economies has experi-
enced major commodity restructuring—that is, major
changes in the commodity mix and volume of agricul-
tural production, consumption, and trade. The main fea-
ture of the restructuring has been a substantial drop in
agricultural production, especially in the livestock sector
(table 1).3,4 The data in the table are based on countries’
official production numbers, which exaggerate the
decline in output. In the pre-reform period, farms often
overstated their production to look better with respect to
output target performance. In the transition period,
farms have an incentive to understate production to
avoid taxes and buttress their arguments for more state
support. The difficulty of measuring the growing output
by private farmers and the informal sector increases the
likelihood of undercounting transition production. Yet,
even if not wholly accurate, the official numbers clearly
show a large decline in output. The downsizing of the
agricultural sector has also coincided with a major drop
in consumption of livestock products (table 2).5
The drop in agricultural production has been part of
an economy-wide decline in output (table 1). In most
transition economies, industry has also contracted
substantially (especially heavy industry), and gross
domestic product (GDP) is also down in most. As
with agriculture, the decline in output in industry and
in GDP as indicated by the table is overstated. For
largely the same reasons given for agriculture, the
official output numbers for industry on which the
table figures are based exaggerate the drop. The GDP
figures are probably more downwardly biased than
those for agriculture and industry. The fastest growing
sectors in GDP involve services (everything from hair
styling to legal work), which either did not exist dur-
ing the socialist period or were severely underrepre-
sented in official macroeconomic accounts. Because
growth in services is hard to measure, these sectors
are underrepresented in countries’ GDP accounts.
3 The exceptions are Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, whose experi-
ences are examined later in this report.
4 For data on agricultural production and trade, as well as analysis
of key issues involving specific countries’ agriculture, see the
briefing rooms on Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine at the
ERS Web site www.ers.usda.gov
5 A recent ERS study (Cochrane, 2002) focuses on how reform in
the transition economies has restructured the livestock sector. The
report examines how reform has reduced the production and con-
sumption of livestock products, as well as generated institutional
change within the sector, as illustrated by a number of case studies.
The report also uses a simulation model to forecast how various
reform and policy developments, such as reducing subsidies to agri-
culture and creating land markets, would affect livestock production,
consumption, and trade.
Table 1—Agricultural and industrial production and GDP all fall
Index of change in production
Countries Grain Meat Agriculture Industry GDP
Hungary 88 65 72 112 98
Czech Republic1 87 73 72 86 91
Poland 99 98 92 108 122
Romania 93 76 97 68 75
Bulgaria 68 50 59 50 68
Russia 61 48 60 50 61
Ukraine 61 41 51 39 39
Kazakstan 46 45 47 44 51
Belarus 73 57 58 96 71
Uzbekistan 246 108 99 72 97
Turkmenistan 335 126 118 45 90
Note: The indices give average annual output for 1997-99 relative to average annual output for 1986-90, with 1986-90 = 100.  For example, the index of
72 for agriculture for Hungary means that total agricultural output in Hungary for 1997-99 equaled 72 percent of output for 1986-90.  All changes are in
volume (or real) terms.
1 For grain and meat, the indices cover the Czeck and Slovak Republics combined.
Source: USDA, OECD, and PlanEcon.Economic Research Service/USDA Changes in Agricultural Markets in Transition Economies / AER-806  5
The main reason agricultural and industrial output and
GDP have fallen in most transition economies is that
consumers’ desires for goods have replaced planners’
preferences as the dominant force in determining what
goods are produced, consumed, and traded. The con-
traction and commodity restructuring of transition
agriculture has therefore been an inevitable part of
market reform. To examine the downsizing of agricul-
ture, one must first explore certain features of the pre-
reform agricultural economy.
The Pre-Reform Agriculture and 
Food Economy
In the late 1960s, the leadership of the USSR decided
to increase production of livestock goods, a policy the
Eastern European countries of the Soviet bloc gener-
ally followed. Consequently, from 1970 to 1990, live-
stock herds and output in these countries grew by 40-
60 percent (for example, 63 percent in the USSR, 43
percent in Poland, and 57 percent in Hungary). The
rise in feed requirements caused by the growing herds
stimulated the crop sector. In the late 1980s, the aver-
age annual output of feed grain in the USSR and
Poland was up by about half compared with output in
the late 1960s, and in Hungary the rise was about one-
quarter. The feed requirements of the USSR were so
great that the country also became a substantial
importer of grain, soybeans, and soybean meal, much
of it from the United States (table 3).
By 1990, per capita consumption of livestock products
and foodstuffs in general in transition economies com-
pared favorably with levels in many OECD nations
(table 2). Because per capita GDP in the USSR and
Eastern Europe was at most only half the OECD aver-
age, these countries were producing and consuming
high-cost livestock products at a much higher volume
than one would expect based on the countries’ real
income. This “achievement” came at a price, as large
state subsidies, to both producers and consumers, were
necessary to maintain the high levels of production
and consumption. For example, by 1990 direct budget
subsidies to the agriculture and food economy were
about 10 percent of GDP in the USSR and between 5
and 10 percent of GDP in most Eastern European
countries. The bulk of the subsidies went to the live-
stock sector.
Supply and demand analysis can be used to show
how market reform has changed agricultural produc-
tion, consumption, and trade in transition agriculture,
with special emphasis on the contraction of the live-
stock sector. Figure 1 identifies the “market” for a
typical agricultural good in a transition economy
before reform. S1 is the supply curve and D1 is the
Table 2—Per capita consumption of foodstuffs
1990
United Great
Foodstuff Poland Hungary Romania Russia Ukraine States Germany Britain Japan
Kilograms
Meat 73 101 74 75 68 113 96 72 38
Milk 
(excluding butter) 230 178 99 1841 1841 256 224 227 65
Cereals 145 148 173 1641 1641 109 94 93 133
Potatoes 144 58 59 106 131 55 81 105 25
1997
United Great
Foodstuff Poland Hungary Romania Russia Ukraine States Germany Britain Japan
Kilograms
Meat 66 84 50 48 32 117 83 73 42
Milk 
(excluding butter) 204 156 179 145 156 254 236 234 68
Cereals 157 113 205 156 160 116 83 95 118
Potatoes 136 66 82 125 126 62 79 113 26
1 Figure for entire USSR.
Source: FAO.6  Changes in Agricultural Markets in Transition Economies / AER-806 Economic Research Service/USDA
demand curve. The state set prices for both producers
and consumers. Producers receive a price of P5,
which motivates them to produce Q5.6 The consumer
price is P1, such that consumers wish to buy Q6.
However, consumers must settle for the actual level
of production Q5.
In the transition economies, pre-reform producer
prices for agricultural goods typically exceeded con-
sumer prices. Thus, the producer price P5 in figure 1
is greater than the consumer price P1. Figure 2 gives
the ratio of pre-reform producer prices to consumer
prices for agricultural goods for various transition
economies.7 Government budget subsidies were nec-
essary to cover the gap, with the difference between
producer and consumer prices indicating how large
the subsidies had to be. For example, the ratio of pro-
ducer to consumer prices in Poland in 1986 was about
1.8; that is, budget subsidies alone to the agriculture
and food economy equaled about 80 percent of all
consumer expenditure on agricultural goods.
Another feature of the pre-reform food economy in
transition economies was that consumer prices for
foodstuffs were set so low that output could not sat-
isfy the demand generated by the prices. In figure 1,
this effect results in a market shortage of the good, or
excess demand, equal to Q5Q6.  In the pre-reform
period, long lines of shoppers and food stores with
empty shelves were commonly interpreted in both the
Soviet bloc countries and the West as signs of major
food shortages. Low state-set consumer prices that
overly stimulated demand, however, were the main
cause of these “market” shortages, rather than inade-






Soybeans and soybean meal1 4,500 850
Meat 868 1,970
Imports from United States
Grain 13,700 660
Soybeans and soybean meal1 1,720 160
Meat 30 1,200
Note: Figures give average annual values over the period. Imports for























Price liberalization within a single market
Note: Identification of price (P) and quantity (Q) values:
P1  is the pre-reform consumer price.
P3  is the producer and consumer price after price liberalization  
  within this market alone.
P5  is the pre-reform producer price.
Q4  is the quantity of production and consumption after price  
  liberalization within this market alone.
Q5  is the pre-reform quantity of production.
Q6  is the pre-reform quantity demanded by consumers.
Source: ERS.
6 One can argue that in most pre-reform countries of the Soviet
bloc, markets did not really exist for agricultural goods on the sup-
ply side, which means a market supply curve did not exist.  Pro-
ducers did not freely determine their output in response to prices.
Rather, they were given an output target, which they sold to the
state at the state-determined price.  With respect to figure 1, Q5
would be the economy-wide output target for the good in question.
The pre-reform supply curve is therefore really the economy-wide
marginal cost of production curve for the good.  P5 identifies the
per unit full cost of producing the last units of output needed to
reach the total output level of Q5.
7 The producer prices used in figure 2 are in fact full producer
incentive prices.  They equal the actual monetary prices producers
received plus budget subsidies per unit of output.  The incentive
price of P5 gives the full “price” that producers in a market econ-
omy must receive to produce Q5 of output.Economic Research Service/USDA Changes in Agricultural Markets in Transition Economies / AER-806  7
quate supplies of foodstuffs in any material sense (as
the inter-country comparison of consumption in table
2 shows).
Price Liberalization
The lead policy of economic reform in the transition
economies was price liberalization, which involved
the corollary policy of reducing or eliminating state
budget subsidies needed to maintain gaps between
prices paid to producers and prices charged to con-
sumers. In figure 1, the immediate effect of freeing
prices and eliminating budget subsidies for the good
in question is that both the producer and consumer
price move to P3. (S1, the marginal cost of production
curve, now becomes the market supply curve.) Pro-
duction and consumption fall from Q5 to the market
clearing level of Q4.
The drop in output from Q5 to Q4 measures the effect
of reform on production from liberalizing the market
for only this particular good. However, price liberaliza-
tion had two other major effects on markets for agricul-
tural products. The freeing of prices led to high econ-
omy-wide inflation, in most countries in the hundreds
(and in some cases thousands) of percent annually in
the early reform years. The massive inflation substan-
tially reduced consumers’real income and, correspond-
ingly, purchasing power, as prices economy-wide rose
by a greater percentage than wages and salaries (fig. 3).
The decline was particularly severe in Russia and
Ukraine, where real incomes fell during the 1990s by
half or more. The decrease reflects not only the drop in
pay for workers who kept their jobs, but also the rise in
unemployment during the transition period.
The fall in real income reduced demand for foodstuffs,
represented in figure 4 by the shift left in the demand
curve from D1 to D2 (figure 4 reproduces and adds to
figure 1). The drop in demand decreases both produc-
tion and consumption from Q4 to Q3. The degree to
which demand falls for a particular foodstuff depends
on how sensitive demand is to changes in income (the
income elasticity of demand). Among foodstuffs,
demand for livestock products is relatively sensitive to
changes in income (income elastic), such that declining
income in the transition economies particularly hurt the
livestock sector. The downsizing of the livestock sector
also lowered demand for animal feed (feed grains and
oilseeds), and thereby hurt those markets. This effect,
rather than the drop in human demand for grain and
oilseed products because of falling real income,
accounted for most of the reform-driven shift to the left
in the demand curves for these crops.
For certain foods, such as bread and potatoes, demand
can rise rather than fall when income decreases (infe-
rior goods). In figure 4, this would shift the demand
curve right. During the transition, consumption of
cereals and potatoes in some countries has risen, sug-
gesting that for these countries the products might in



















Source: Computed from ERS (1994).
Poland Hungary Czechoslovakia       USSR8  Changes in Agricultural Markets in Transition Economies / AER-806 Economic Research Service/USDA
In addition to this demand-side effect, price liberal-
ization also affected the supply side of the market by
raising the real prices for agricultural inputs. In the
inflation that followed price liberalization, prices for
agricultural inputs rose by a much greater percentage
than prices for agricultural output. This effect
increased the real prices producers had to pay for
inputs, or in other words, worsened producers’ terms
of trade (fig. 5). In most CEECs, such as Poland,
Hungary, and Romania, agricultural producers’ terms
of trade have dropped by 30-60 percent, while in
Russia and Ukraine they have deteriorated by about
75 percent. In 1992, Russian wheat producers on
average had to sell 0.3 tons of output to purchase 1 ton
of nitrogen fertilizer. In 1997, they had to sell 1.4 tons
of wheat to buy the same amount of input (Russian
Federation, 1998).
The rise in input prices increases producers’per unit
costs of production. This effect is represented in figure 4
by the leftward shift in the supply curve from S1 to S2.
The shift in supply cuts production and consumption
further to Q2. (To avoid cluttering figure 4, Q2 is used
to represent two different quantities—the level of pro-
duction and consumption after economy-wide price lib-
eralization referred to in this paragraph, associated with
point F, and the quantity of production after price and
trade liberalization within this market alone, associated
with point H, which is discussed later. These two quan-
tities would usually be different.) The drop in output
occurs because higher real prices for inputs result in
reduced use in production. For example, from 1990 to
1997, Russian fertilizer use per hectare fell 80 percent,
from 88 to 16 kilograms (Russian Federation, 2000).
Price liberalization could result in input prices rising
relative to output prices for two reasons. The first is
that in the pre-reform period, prices for inputs were
set lower relative to their production cost than were
prices for output. When prices were then freed, prices
for inputs had to rise more than prices for output to






















Note:  For Poland, Hungary, and Romania, figure begins in 1986, with 1986 = 100. For Russia and Ukraine, figure begins in 1990, with 
1990 = 100.
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price-setting behavior means that in the pre-reform
period, producers were subsidized not only through
direct budget subsidies, but also indirectly through the
price system.
The second possible reason input prices could rise rela-
tive to output prices involves not only market liberaliza-
tion but also the market structure for suppliers of agri-
cultural inputs. In the pre-reform period, farms were
typically dependent for the supply of any particular
input on just a few, and perhaps only one, large state
distributor(s). During the early reform years, markets in
most transition economies were liberalized and the
input distributors privatized without the latter being
broken up into smaller competing units. During the
transition period, farms have accused the large suppliers
of using their monopoly-type market power inherited
from the old system to charge higher prices than would
be possible if a number of smaller competitive suppliers
existed, prices that exceed the input producers’costs of
Figure 4
Price and trade liberalization
Note: Identification of price (P) and quantity (Q) values:
P1  is the pre-reform consumer price.
P2  is the producer and consumer price after price and trade liberalization.
P4  is the producer and consumer price after economy-wide price liberalization.
P5  is the pre-reform producer price.
Q1  is the quantity of production after price and trade liberalization.
Q2  is the quantity of production and consumption after economy-wide price liberalization; it also is the quantity of production after  
  price and trade liberalization within this market alone.  Q2 is used to represent two different values simply to avoid cluttering the figure.
Q3  is the quantity of production and consumption after both price liberalization within this market alone and the drop in consumer demand  
  from declining real income following economy-wide price liberalization.
Q4  is the quantity of production and consumption after price liberalization within this market alone; it also is the quantity of consumption 
  after price and trade liberalization.  Q4 is used to represent two different values simply to avoid cluttering the figure.
Q5  is the pre-reform quantity of production.
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production. Higher input prices raise farms’production
costs. In figure 4, such pricing behavior would con-
tribute to the leftward shift in the supply curve from S1
to S2. 
Although common to most transition economies, this
problem is hard to gauge. In most NIS countries, such
as Russia and Ukraine, local authorities continue to
help the large former state and collective farms obtain
inputs, often at below-market prices, in return for the
farms’ willingness to sell the authorities a certain
amount of output at agreed-upon prices. Because the
prices of both inputs and output exchanged in these
deals often deviate from existing “market” prices, it is
difficult to determine whether farms are on net gaining
or losing from the arrangement. Given that NIS
regional governments have been paternalistic toward
farms in their jurisdictions, fearing that defunct farms
would create unemployment and possibly food secu-
rity problems, they have probably not used their power
over farms much to the latters’ disadvantage.
Because the relationship between farms and local
governments in Central and Eastern Europe is weaker
than in NIS countries, CEEC farms might be more
vulnerable to input suppliers with market power.
However, evidence indicates that processors in CEECs
do not have strong market power, with food process-
ing being even less concentrated than in Western
Europe. For example, the top four flour processors in
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania
have less market power than their counterparts in
France, Germany, or the United Kingdom (Gorton et
al., 2000).  
It therefore appears that most of the worsening in
agricultural producers’ terms of trade during transi-
tion resulted not from the abuse of market power by
input suppliers, but rather from correction of the
price-cost disparity for goods in the pre-reform
period. If so, the worsening of producers’ terms of
trade with price liberalization is evidence of the
degree to which the pre-reform price system helped























Note:  The index values identify the change in the prices agricultural producers received for their output relative to the change in the 
prices producers paid for inputs.  For Poland, Hungary, and Romania, the figure begins in 1986, with 1986 = 100.  For Russia and 
Ukraine, the figure begins in 1990, with 1990 = 100.
Source: OECD.Economic Research Service/USDA Changes in Agricultural Markets in Transition Economies / AER-806  11
Trade Liberalization
The second major reform policy that affected com-
modity restructuring in agriculture was trade liberal-
ization. Assume in figure 4 that the world price for the
good in question is P2, compared with the domestic
price after price liberalization but before trade liberal-
ization of P4. If the country allows free trade in the
good and internal markets are functioning well, the
world price will determine the domestic price. The
domestic price will therefore drop to P2. Production
will fall from Q2 to Q1, consumption will rise from Q2
to Q4, and the country will import Q1Q4 of the good.
(In figure 4, Q4 is used to represent the quantity of
consumption after price and trade liberalization, asso-
ciated with point I, as well as the quantity of produc-
tion and consumption after price liberalization within
this market alone, associated with point C. These two
quantities would usually be different, but again are
made equal simply to avoid cluttering the figure.)
When transition economies liberalized trade, world
market prices for agricultural goods were typically
below rather than above domestic prices (the empirical
evidence is discussed later in the section that examines
why forecasting studies underestimated the output drop
during transition). Setting domestic producer prices
above world trade prices was the third way by which
the pre-reform system subsidized agriculture. For cer-
tain countries and goods, though, world prices were
above domestic prices. This means that with trade lib-
eralization, domestic prices rose to world levels, and
pre-reform production was taxed rather than subsidized
relative to the world market. One could easily use fig-
ure 4 to show that in this case the (isolated) effect of
trade liberalization would be increased production,
decreased consumption, and increased exports of the
good. Transition economies that currently are net
exporters of agricultural commodities include Poland
and Hungary with pork, Hungary and Romania with
grain, and Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan with cotton.
The pre-reform scenario depicted in figure 1 assumes
that the country is not trading any of the good in ques-
tion. However, the pre-reform transition economies did
engage in agricultural trade. Most of their agricultural
exports went to other states within the Soviet bloc,
particularly Russia. (For the countries of the former
USSR, these “exports” were part of inter-republic
flows.) Examples include exports of meat by Hungary,
Romania, Ukraine and Kazakstan; grain by Hungary,
Ukraine, and Kazakstan; sugar by Ukraine; and cotton
by Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.
The pre-reform trade in agriculture was not market-
driven but rather was an integral part of countries’ eco-
nomic planning. As a result, the collapse of the Soviet
bloc and central planning abruptly reduced the com-
modity flows. Because these exports were generally
lower in quality than corresponding output sold on the
world market, alternative foreign markets could not
necessarily be found. The loss of markets within the
former Soviet bloc reinforced the drop in demand from
falling domestic consumer income. This effect caused
the demand curve for such products to shift even fur-
ther to the left.8 Over time, some CEECs have
expanded their agricultural exports to the European
Union. For certain CEECs, such as Poland and Hun-
gary, this export growth has more than compensated
for the loss of export markets in other transition
economies. By the late 1990s, their total agricultural
exports in value terms exceeded pre-reform levels.9
The USSR was also a major agricultural importer of
products from outside the Soviet bloc (with most of
the imports again going to Russia). The main imports
included feed grain, soybeans, and soybean meal,
needed to feed the growing livestock herds.10 The
reform-driven contraction of the livestock sector has
severely reduced these imports (table 3). Instead of
importing feed to support their expensively maintained
livestock herds, the countries of the former USSR
(again mainly Russia) are importing meat and other
livestock products directly. From the second half of the
1980s to the period 1995-98, average annual meat
imports by the countries of the former USSR rose by
about 125 percent.11
8 In the pre-reform scenario depicted in figure 1, exports would
result in a new demand curve, called D3, which lay to the right of,
and parallel to, D1.  The horizontal distance between the two
demand curves would equal the level of exports.  Loss of this trade
would shift the operative demand curve from D3 to D1.
9 For further discussion of the effects of reform on the agricultural
trade of the CEECs, in particular their growing trade with the EU,
see ERS (1993) and ERS (1999a).
10 This point takes issue with the criticism often made of the for-
mer USSR that it could not even feed itself.  Rather than allaying
food shortages, the imports of animal feed were used to maintain
artificially high levels of livestock production and consumption.
11 The reason the data in table 3 stop at 1998 is that in 1999 and
2000 the United States and EU gave Russia substantial food aid.
The official Russian foreign trade data do not distinguish between
commercial imports and food aid, and separating out the two cate-
gories of inflows would be overly difficult.12  Changes in Agricultural Markets in Transition Economies / AER-806 Economic Research Service/USDA
The NIS region’s switch from being a major importer of
animal feed to a major importer of meat and other live-
stock products suggests that the region has a compara-
tive disadvantage in the production of livestock prod-
ucts relative to animal feed; that is, the region produces
meat and other livestock products at a higher cost than it
produces animal feed, relative to world market prices.
Liefert (1994) supports this conclusion. He finds that at
the end of the Soviet period, the USSR had a compara-
tive disadvantage in meat production compared with
grain production. That agricultural trade during the
Soviet period appears to have been inconsistent with
comparative advantage shows the extent to which trade
was driven by policy rather than economic rationality.
Liefert (forthcoming) shows that in the late 1990s, Rus-
sia continued to have a comparative disadvantage in
meat production compared with grain production.
In the pre-reform period, the United States was a major
exporter of grain, soybeans, and soybean meal to the
former USSR. In the wake of the changes in NIS agri-
cultural trade, U.S. exports of all these products to the
region have fallen substantially. However, the United
States has moved from exporting almost no meat to the
region in the pre-reform period to being a major meat
exporter.  The bulk of the exports are poultry, going
mostly to Russia. In fact, during the second half of the
1990s, Russia took nearly half of all U.S. poultry
exports. Because the changes in NIS agricultural trade
are being driven by the economic fundamentals of com-
parative advantage, rather than any short-run “disrup-
tions” of transition, the changes in the volume and
structure of U.S. agricultural exports to the NIS region
are not likely to be reversed in the foreseeable future.
Why Price and Trade Liberalization
Reduced Agricultural Output
Price and trade liberalization substantially changed
prices and incomes—the two main factors on which
producers and consumers base their decisions to pro-
duce, buy, and sell goods. Changes in these variables
in turn induced major changes in agricultural produc-
tion, consumption, and trade. The decline in output,
particularly in the livestock sector, was inevitable.
Price liberalization caused output for a typical good to
fall for three reasons—liberalization and elimination of
budget subsidies within that market alone, the drop in
consumer income, and the rise in inputs’ real prices,
with the last two effects occurring from economy-wide
price liberalization. Trade liberalization added a fourth
reason production could drop—world prices lying
below domestic producer prices.
Another way to explain why economic reform has
reduced agricultural output is to identify how the pre-
reform system directly and indirectly subsidized agri-
culture, and how the elimination of these subsidies
through price and trade liberalization caused produc-
tion to drop. The three main types of subsidies were
direct budget subsidies from the government, the
domestic price system that kept prices for agricultural
inputs low relative to producer output prices and the
real costs of production, and the price and trade sys-
tem that kept producer prices above world trade prices.
Certain “transition economies” have experienced no
drop in aggregate agricultural output during the 1990s.
In Uzbekistan, total production has not fallen, and in
Turkmenistan, it has increased (table 1). However, the
absence of a decline in output for such countries
reflects failure to reform, rather than reform success.
These countries have been the least reformist, not only
in agriculture but economy-wide, with the state retain-
ing strong control over agriculture. In fact, in the
World Bank grading of agricultural reform progress
among the transition economies, Uzbekistan and Turk-
menistan (along with Belarus) are at the bottom of the
list. However, major changes have occurred in these
two countries’ commodity composition of output.
Their main agricultural policy since the Soviet Union
broke up has been to move away from heavily pushing
cotton production to producing more foodstuffs, in
particular grain. This explains why in table 1 grain
output in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan during the
1990s more than doubled and tripled, respectively.
Because the decline in agricultural output (in most
transition economies) has been a necessary conse-
quence of market liberalization, the change in output is
a misleading indicator of the success of agricultural
reform. The degree to which output has fallen in indi-
vidual countries is largely a measure of the extent to
which in the pre-reform period agriculture was subsi-
dized, planners’ preferences for goods deviated from
consumers’ preferences, and the structure of countries’
production and foreign trade differed from that based
on comparative advantage.12
12 Although examining why industrial output has also fallen during
the transition period is beyond the scope of this report, the general
reasons are the same as those given for agriculture.  Planners’
desires for goods dominated those of consumers, industrial pro-
duction was subsidized (especially in heavy industry, such as met-
allurgy and chemicals), and production and trade were not driven
by countries’ comparative advantage vis-à-vis the world market.
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High Transaction Costs Resulting From
Undeveloped Market Infrastructure
Liberalization policies hit agricultural markets fast and
hard during the early reform years. A more protracted
reason for the decline in agricultural output has been
deficient market infrastructure, both physical and insti-
tutional. Poor infrastructure increases farms’ costs and
risks of producing and, in particular, selling output—
that is, it raises the transaction costs of doing business.
Although undeveloped physical and commercial infra-
structure can also be a difficulty for industry, it is par-
ticularly problematic for agriculture, largely because
of the perishability of foodstuffs.
Just as an increase in the cost of inputs shifts the pro-
ducers’ supply curve to the left, so also does an
increase in transaction costs. In figure 4, high transac-
tion costs would be represented by shifting the supply
curve S2 further to the left. With the world price of P2
setting the domestic price, the leftward shift in supply
would cause production to fall below Q1.
All the transition economies inherited from the pre-
reform period poor systems of physical infrastructure.
Although storage capacity is inadequate, the main
weakness is transportation, particularly the poor road
system. In some countries, the cost of shipping agri-
cultural commodities between regions exceeds pro-
ducer prices. In addition, the deficient transportation
and storage systems increase the risk of spoilage.
Transition economies also undertook reform without the
benefit of established market infrastructure. The pre-
reform planned system did not need, and therefore did
not provide, the type of commercial and institutional
infrastructure that a market-oriented agricultural econ-
omy requires. Producers and, especially, traders need a
financial system that allows fast, affordable access to
capital, a system for quick and inexpensive dissemina-
tion of market information (where can one buy and sell,
and at what price?), and a strong system of commercial
law that protects property and enforces contracts. The
absence of this market infrastructure increases the risks
and transaction costs of doing business.
An endemic problem in these economies that raises
transaction costs is extortion and bribery, a conse-
quence largely of the dysfunctional legal system. The
problem is particularly serious for sellers of agricul-
tural products. The easily identifiable and spoilable
nature of their output makes them vulnerable to van-
dalism by extortionists or corrupt officials.
Producers must compete, especially vis-à-vis imports,
with respect to all aspects of their operations—sales as
well as primary production. High transaction costs,
particularly in NIS countries, make it difficult for
domestic producers in outlying regions to compete
with food imports. The large agricultural imports of
the Soviet period led to the creation of a relatively
well-functioning and inexpensive system for moving
imports from entry ports to high-consuming urban
areas, such as Moscow and St. Petersburg (which itself
is a port).
These transaction costs can be roughly measured by
comparing producer prices for agricultural commodi-
ties within countries with world prices.  Often, pro-
ducer prices have been far below world trade prices,
which under normal market conditions would result in
the countries’ exporting the products. However, the
goods in question often were not exported, and in
many cases countries imported the products. High
transaction costs precluded export; that is, if transac-
tion costs were added to the costs of production, the
total cost would make the goods uncompetitive on the
world market or with imports.
For example, in the first half of the 1990s, producer
prices for all agricultural commodities in Russia were
far below world prices, which were two to four times
greater than Russian producer prices (Liefert et al.,
1996). Yet, Russia was not a net exporter of any major
agricultural goods, and for a number of products it was
in fact a net importer.
The economic crisis that hit Russia in August 1998,
and agriculture’s response to it, provides further evi-
dence of the harmful effect of high transaction costs
on agriculture. As a result of the crisis, the ruble
depreciated against Western currencies by as much as
80 percent. The depreciation substantially raised the
domestic currency prices of imports, such that imports
fell significantly. In 1999, agricultural imports
dropped by about half. This hurt U.S. agricultural
exports to Russia, especially of poultry, as well as
exports by various transition economies to Russia,
such as Polish pork.
By raising the price competitiveness of all domestic
output vis-à-vis imports and the world market, the cur-
rency depreciation provided an excellent opportunity14  Changes in Agricultural Markets in Transition Economies / AER-806 Economic Research Service/USDA
An empirical study by Macours and Swinnen
(2000a) on the causes of agricultural output decline
in transition economies strongly supports this ERS
report’s analysis of why agricultural production has
fallen. This report argues that the drop in agricul-
tural output has resulted mainly from the policies of
market liberalization—price and trade liberalization
and reduction of subsidies. According to Macours
and Swinnen, market liberalization policies account
for about three-quarters of the output decline in
their study.
The Macours and Swinnen (M&S) study covers the
output of five crops (wheat, corn, barley, sugar, and
oilseeds) in eight CEECs during 1989-95. The eight
countries are Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, and
Slovenia.
The study econometrically measures the contribution
of various reform policies and developments to the
production drop (see table). Uncertainty hurts output
because it motivates farmers to reduce input use.
Disruption from farm restructuring lowers output
because of temporary inefficiencies, such as upset-
ting contractual relations and poor initial allocations
on farms of the key inputs of land, labor, and capital.
Individual farms is the only variable in the study
found to increase output, as the move from large
collective farms to small individual ones improves
the incentives to use labor and other inputs more
productively.
The two explanatory variables in M&S that capture
the output effects from market liberalization are
price changes and privatization. Price changes cov-
ers changes in agricultural output prices relative to
changes in input prices (that is, producers’ terms of
trade) that result from price and trade liberalization.
Because the analysis of the drop in output as pre-
sented in this report using figures 1 and 4 focuses on
how price and trade liberalization changes prices, the
fall in output attributed to the variable price changes
in M&S corresponds to most of the output decline as
identified in this ERS report. M&S find that price
changes account for 46 percent of the drop in output.
Privatization measures the share of privately owned
land. The move to privatization can have two oppo-
site effects on output. The positive effect is that like
individual farming, privatization can improve incen-
tives to use inputs more productively, thereby
increasing production. The negative effect is that pri-
vatization imposes a “hard budget constraint,” which
means that farms must become self-financing rather
than dependent on the state for various subsidies.
The drop in subsidies reduces input use, which low-
ers output. M&S find that privatization is responsi-
ble for 39 percent of the net fall in production. This
finding shows that the negative hard budget con-
straint impact on output from privatization heavily
dominates the positive efficiency effect. However,
M&S point out that privatization encourages under-
reporting of output by farms, both to reduce taxation
and to strengthen farms’ arguments that they need
more state support. The likelihood of underreporting
means that privatization might account for somewhat
less than the 39 percent of the drop in production
calculated by M&S.
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, privatiza-
tion decreases output by reducing subsidies to farms.
In figure 1, the pre-reform producer price P5 is the
producer incentive price, which equals the actual
price received plus per unit subsidies. The negative
Measuring the Causes of Output Decline












Total output change -100
Source: Macours and Swinnen (2000a).
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to stimulate Russian agricultural production. However,
it appears that agriculture has responded only mildly.
Although total agricultural output in Russia increased
in 1999 and 2000 by 3 and 5 percent, this was mainly
because weather improved in these years compared
with the terrible weather year of 1998 (which produced
Russia’s lowest grain harvest in decades). In 2000, total
agricultural production was still 4 percent lower than in
1997 (admittedly a very good weather year). 
The change in Russia’s production of livestock goods
is a better indicator of the response to ruble deprecia-
tion than the change in crop production, given that
Russia imports more livestock products than crops (in
value terms), and that livestock output is not as vul-
nerable to the weather. In 1999 livestock production
declined 4 percent, while aggregate output in 2000
was unchanged. The 2000 performance, in fact, repre-
sents some progress, because it was the first year
since reform began that livestock output did not fall.
Other positive indicators in 2000 were the marginal
improvement in farm profitability (the number of
unprofitable farms fell from 54 to 48 percent), and the
rise in output of agricultural inputs (Serova, 2001).
This evidence supports the conclusion that the iso-
lated effect of major ruble depreciation on agricultural
output has been positive, though hardly robust.
Ruble depreciation should stimulate domestic produc-
tion by raising the domestic ruble prices of agricultural
goods that compete with imports. The actual modest
output response suggests that transmission between
changes in the exchange rate and changes in domestic
agricultural prices is not strong. Osborne and Liefert
(2001) calculate that transmission between changes in
the exchange rate and retail food prices in Russia is
fairly weak. The most likely reason for low price
transmission is high transaction costs due to deficient
physical and institutional infrastructure, which work to
segment regional markets within the country from
each other as well as isolate these regional markets
from the world market.
effect on output because of privatization in M&S
would be captured in figure 1 by the fall in produc-
tion from Q5 to Q4. The examination of the fall in
agricultural production in this ERS report therefore
covers the output effects from both changes in prices
and privatization as defined and measured by M&S.
These two variables in the M&S study together
explain 85 percent of the drop in output, though the
number should be reduced somewhat because of the
incentives for farms under privatization to switch
from overreporting to underreporting output. Thus,
the policies of market liberalization—liberalizing
prices and trade and reducing subsidies—probably
account for about three-quarters of the reform-driven
drop in agricultural output in the M&S study.
The one major cause of agricultural output decline
examined in this ERS report that M&S do not meas-
ure is high transaction costs resulting from undevel-
oped market infrastructure. The explanatory variable
in M&S probably closest to this factor is uncer-
tainty. In M&S, 11 percent of the output decline
cannot be explained by the variables identified. This
residual 11 percent could therefore capture the out-
put decline from undeveloped market infrastructure.




At the start of the transition period, some Western
forecasting studies used models to predict how eco-
nomic reform could change various countries’ agricul-
tural production, consumption, and trade.  Liefert et al.
(1993) and Tyers (1994) did so for the NIS region, and
Cochrane (1990) for Poland.  Rather than forecasting
major drops in output, the studies generally projected
nontrivial increases in grain output, and much smaller
declines in meat production than actually occurred
(table 4). 
In fairness to these studies, it should be noted they
were not necessarily predicting what would actually
happen to the commodity structure of agriculture in
the transition economies 5-10 years after reform
began. Rather, their intention was to forecast changes
based on the general premise (fleshed out with specific
assumptions) that fairly ambitious reform would be
pursued.  Most of the transition economies, and espe-
cially those in the NIS region, have adopted agricul-
tural reform programs less ambitious than those that
would be consistent with the forecasters’ assumptions.
Reform has been particularly slow in the area of farm-
and enterprise-level restructuring, the key to productiv-
ity growth. As a result, agricultural productivity
growth in the transition economies has not achieved
the levels assumed by the forecasters in their models.
Nonetheless, examining why the studies underesti-
mated the decline in agricultural production during
transition can help identify what can be learned about
the problems and challenges of agricultural reform that
were not sufficiently understood or anticipated at the
start of reform. There are three main reasons why the
studies underestimated the fall in agricultural output:
(1) they underestimated the magnitude of total pre-
reform support to agriculture; (2) they ignored or
underrated the extent to which high transaction costs
from deficient infrastructure would hurt agriculture;
(3) and they assumed productivity in the agro-food
economy would grow over the forecasting period by
more than it in fact has.
Western estimates of agricultural subsidies in the pre-
reform economies were based on the measure of sup-
port called producer support estimates (PSE).13 The
PSE for a good equals the difference between produc-
ers’ “real,” or incentive, price and the good’s trade or
border price (converted to domestic currency with a
meaningful exchange rate). The producers’ incentive
price is the actual monetary price received for a good
plus any per unit budget subsidies. The PSE is conven-
tionally expressed as the gap between the producer
incentive price and the trade price, divided by the pro-
ducer incentive price. In figure 4, the pre-reform
incentive price is P5, while the world price is P2. The
PSE for the good equals (P5 – P2)/P5.
PSEs measure the per unit transfer of income to pro-
ducers from government policies that keep the produc-
ers’ incentive price above the free trade price. PSEs
capture two of the general types of subsidies for agri-
culture that existed in the pre-reform economies and
were discussed before—budget subsidies and price
Table 4—Forecasts of changes in agricultural production
Grain Meat
Country Forecast Actual Forecast Actual
Percent change
USSR (Liefert et al.) -5 -39 -10 -57
USSR (Tyers) 14 -39 -8 -57
Russia 14 -39 -10 -52
Ukraine 18 -39 -8 -59
Poland 14 -1 17 -2
Note: The figures in the Forecast column give the predicted change in output 5-10 years after reform is implemented. The figures in the Actual column give
the actual change in average annual output between 1986-90 and 1997-99.
Source: Liefert et al. (1993); Tyers (1994); Cochrane (1990); USDA for actual changes.
13 PSEs are the most commonly used measure of support to agri-
culture not only for transition economies, but for all countries
regardless of systemic considerations. PSEs originally were called
producer subsidy equivalents. In 1999, the Agricultural Directorate
of the OECD, which annually calculates PSEs for all member
countries (as well as for some nonmember countries, including
transition economies), changed its use of the phrase to producer
support estimates. This is now the more commonly used term,
though some researchers continue to use the original phrase.Economic Research Service/USDA Changes in Agricultural Markets in Transition Economies / AER-806  17
support policies that kept domestic producer prices
above world trade prices.
In figure 4, eliminating the subsidies captured by the
PSEs causes the producer incentive price to drop from
P5 to P2.  The fall in price reduces output from Q5 to
Q2.  (As mentioned earlier, to avoid cluttering figure
4, Q2 is used to identify not only this new quantity,
associated with point H, but also the quantity of pro-
duction and consumption after economy-wide price
liberalization but before trade liberalization, associated
with point F.)   The greater the pre-reform PSE, the
greater will be the decline in output from liberalization.
Table 5 presents pre-reform PSE estimates for various
transition economies.14 The high values indicate that
liberalization would initially cause agricultural produc-
tion to fall, as the forecasting studies anticipated.  An
examination of the various elements of the PSE values
using the sources identified shows that the greater
share of the PSEs came from border support rather
than budget transfers.  This finding supports the point
made earlier in the study that pre-reform agricultural
producer prices in transition economies generally lay
above world trade prices.
Another type of pre-reform subsidy to agriculture was
indirect support through the domestic price system,
whereby the prices farms had to pay for inputs were
set low relative to output prices and to the real costs of
production.  The PSE method for calculating support
ignores this type of subsidy; thus, the PSEs computed
for transition economies exclude this indirect support.
With respect to figure 4, ignoring this subsidy means
that output forecasts based on PSEs fail to account for
the drop in production from Q2 to Q1.  This output fall
occurs because liberalization results in much larger
rises in prices for agricultural inputs than for agricul-
tural output, thereby worsening producers’ terms of
trade (fig. 5). The deterioration in the terms of trade is
represented in figure 4 by the leftward shift in the sup-
ply curve from S1 to S2. Transition specialists in gen-
eral failed to anticipate the extent to which price liber-
alization would worsen agricultural producers’ terms
of trade with their input suppliers.  The magnitude of
the deterioration in the terms of trade under reform
reveals how strongly the forecasting studies underesti-
mated liberalization’s effect on output from neglecting
this indirect type of subsidy.15
The second reason the studies underestimated the
decline in agricultural output was that they underrated
the extent to which high transaction costs from unde-
veloped market infrastructure would hurt transition
agriculture. Wehrheim et al. (2000) argues that unde-
veloped institutions and infrastructure are the main
problem facing the sector. The studies identified
wholly ignored the issues of market infrastructure and
associated transaction costs.
The third reason the studies underestimated the fall in
output is that they assumed that productivity in the
agro-food economy would grow more than it has once
the transition began. Productivity growth would allow
output to rise without a corresponding increase in
inputs or even allow output to rise with total input use
declining. Also, as the transition economies moved to
freer trade, productivity growth, by reducing costs of
14 The main reason for the differences between the ERS and OECD
PSE calculations is that the OECD uses exchange rates that give
higher values for the currencies of the countries being studied rela-
tive to Western currencies.  These exchange rates give high domes-
tic producer prices relative to world prices when domestic prices
are converted from domestic currency values to U.S. dollar values.
15 Four reasons were identified earlier as to why market liberaliza-
tion reduces output. The first three reasons followed from domestic
price liberalization—the move to market equilibrium from liberal-
ization within a single market, the drop in consumer income, and
the rise in inputs’ real prices—while the fourth reason was trade
liberalization. The fall in output from removing support as meas-
ured by PSEs covers the effects from all of these events, except for
the rise in inputs’ real prices. This last effect is represented by the
shift left in the supply curve, while the other three are represented
by movement along the supply curve. Note also that once a coun-
try opens up to free trade, the drop in consumer income stops
being a contributing cause of the decline in output. Once the world
price determines the domestic price, it also determines the quantity
of output produced. Although the leftward shift in the demand
curve from falling income ceases to affect production, it does
affect the levels of consumption and imports.








NA means not available.
Note: The figures are weighted averages of PSEs for individual commodi-
ties, where the PSE for a commodity equals the gap between the producer
incentive price and the trade price, divided by the producer incentive price.
The calculations cover various years between 1986 and 1990, depending
on the country.
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production, would make domestic output more com-
petitive with products sold on the world market. In fig-
ure 4, productivity growth would shift the supply
curve to the right, thereby increasing production.
The two productivity variables in the forecasting stud-
ies are crop yields and feeding efficiency in the live-
stock sector. Liefert et al. (1993) assumes that reform
in the former USSR would increase crop yields 10-15
percent, and feeding efficiency in the livestock sector
(output per unit of feed) 20-25 percent. Tyers’(1994)
forecasts are based on the assumption that after the ini-
tial disruption of reform, agricultural productivity
throughout the former USSR would revert to its trend
rate of growth. Cochrane (1990) assumes productivity
growth for Polish commodities of 10-30 percent (yields
for crops and feeding efficiency for livestock products).
Contrary to the forecast assumptions that yields would
rise, during the first 5 or so years of reform, they fell
heavily in virtually all transition economies. In the sec-
ond half of the 1990s, yields began to recover in the
faster reforming CEECs, such as Hungary and Poland.
In the NIS region, however, yields have not rebounded
from the large drop. The change in feeding efficiency is
less clear, as it varies by country and product, rising in
some cases and falling in others. The data, however, do
not support a conclusion of overall improvement.Economic Research Service/USDA Changes in Agricultural Markets in Transition Economies / AER-806  19
Consumption and Food 
Security Concerns
The drop in agricultural production during reform has
coincided with a fall in consumption of some food-
stuffs (table 2). The Western media commonly cite the
decline in agricultural output and consumption in Rus-
sia and other (mainly NIS) transition economies as
evidence that transition has worsened food security.
Although transition has created a food security prob-
lem in various countries, the cause of the problem is
not the drop in agricultural output, nor is it more gen-
erally insufficient availability of food supplies. In
some countries, such as Russia, consumption of live-
stock products has declined less than production.
Trade liberalization has resulted in growing imports of
livestock products and other foodstuffs that are costly
to produce domestically (the drop in Russian imports
following the 1998 economic crisis notwithstanding).
As mentioned earlier, before reform, the transition
economies had high per capita levels of consumption
of most foodstuffs, including meat and other high-
value livestock products, compared with even rich
OECD nations. The best evidence of the adequate
availability of foodstuffs during transition is that, even
with food supplies and consumption being relatively
high in the pre-reform period, consumption of staple
foods, such as cereals and potatoes, has remained
steady or even risen. Consumption of high-value live-
stock products has fallen during transition.  However,
per capita GDP in the CEECs and USSR before
reform was at most only half the OECD average.
Consumption of “luxury” livestock products has there-
fore declined during transition to levels more consis-
tent with countries’ real income.  
Reform has threatened food security in Russia and
other transition economies because of problems
involving access to food for segments of the popula-
tion and certain regions within countries. As poverty
increases because of inflation and rising unemploy-
ment, food becomes less affordable to a growing share
of the population. Reports from Russia suggest that as
much as 40 percent of the population might be living
below the poverty level. In addition, within certain
countries, such as Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan,
agricultural surplus-producing regions are restricting
the outflow of foodstuffs. The most benign-possible
reason for this behavior is that regional authorities
wish to protect their own consumers by ensuring that
local supplies are adequate. The most malign-possible
reason is corruption, as officials might be exploiting
the regional price differences created by these restric-
tions to earn easy profits. Whatever the cause, these
controls can prevent food-deficit regions from obtain-
ing needed supplies.
During the 1990s, the United States and EU gave food
aid to a number of transition economies, including
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova, Russia, and Tajikistan.16 The biggest recipi-
ent in recent years has been Russia, which in 1998-
2000 received over 3 million metric tons (mmt) of
commodities from the United States, worth about $1.1
billion, and around 1.8 mmt from the EU, worth
almost $0.5 billion. Some of the U.S. aid was distrib-
uted by private voluntary organizations to the poor and
elderly, while most of the U.S. and EU aid was tar-
geted to food-deficit regions.17
These distribution policies reflect the wisdom of tar-
geting food aid to needy social groups and regions.
Such distribution will not only have the strongest pos-
sible humanitarian effect, but also limit any potential
harm to agricultural producers in the recipient coun-
tries. Funneling food aid to the poor, who have
reduced purchasing power, and to food-deficit regions,
where food prices are high, will minimize the harmful
16 ERS has an ongoing research program that forecasts the food
security needs of countries throughout the world. The transition
economies included in the forecasting exercise are Armenia, Azer-
baijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan (see ERS, 1999b). Key
causes of food insecurity in these countries are political instability
and economic uncertainty, such as repercussions from the eco-
nomic crisis that hit Russia in August 1998 (which, among other
effects, disrupted trade flows within the NIS region).
17 One of the motivating factors in the large aid to Russia was
worry about the potential effects on food availability of Russia’s
economic crisis of 1998. As discussed earlier in this report, the cri-
sis substantially depreciated the Russian ruble against Western cur-
rencies. By raising the price of imported foodstuffs, the deprecia-
tion cut food imports in half.  It has been a commonly held belief
during the transition that Russia imports over half of its food. If
true, the large drop in imports following ruble depreciation could
by itself threaten food security. However, ERS has calculated that
even before Russia’s crisis, imports accounted for only about a
fifth of the country’s total food consumption. Poultry (mainly from
the United States) was the only major foodstuff for which imports
have been providing over half of domestic consumption. However,
imports do account for over half of the food consumed in major
cities such as Moscow and St. Petersburg. Extrapolating the expe-
rience of the big cities to the entire country might explain how the
misconception developed concerning the importance of imports to
total national food supplies (see Liefert and Liefert, 1999).20  Changes in Agricultural Markets in Transition Economies / AER-806 Economic Research Service/USDA
effect that food aid can have on agricultural producers
by depressing prices. 
One of the main effects of market reform in transition
economies is the rise of consumer sovereignty; that is,
the desires of consumers have replaced the preferences
of planners as the dominant force in determining what
goods (and quantities) are produced and consumed.
The reform-driven drop in agricultural production and
consumption is therefore part of the economy-wide
reallocation of resources away from producing and
consuming goods favored by planners and the political
elite to goods favored by consumers. Although it might
seem surprising to describe foodstuffs as goods more
favored by planners than consumers, when the prices of
goods began to reflect the full cost of their production,
consumers switched from buying high-cost livestock
products to other goods and services. Reform has, in
fact, created entirely new goods and, in particular, serv-
ices which consumers were starved of under the old
regime and to which demand is turning during reform.
Much of the worry in both the transition economies and
West about the consequences of declining food produc-
tion and consumption during reform has been based on
the misconception that foodstuffs by their very nature
must be goods more favored by consumers than plan-
ners, such that consumers must on net inevitably suffer
if reform reduces consumption.Economic Research Service/USDA Changes in Agricultural Markets in Transition Economies / AER-806  21
Output Versus Productivity
Growth as Reform 
Performance Indicators
As argued earlier, during the initial years of agricul-
tural reform, the growth of output was an inappropriate
indicator of reform progress.  Once the short- to
medium-term negative output effects of market liberal-
ization have subsided, would output become a valid
indicator of reform success?  We maintain that in the
long run, as well as short run, output is an inappropri-
ate performance indicator.  Rather, growth in produc-
tivity—output per unit of input used in production—is
the single best measure of reform progress.  A way to
argue this point is to examine how agricultural produc-
tion could increase in the future in transition
economies, and in particular how productivity growth
and output are related.
Productivity Growth and Output
One way the transition economies could raise agricul-
tural production is by adopting policies that reverse the
market-driven contraction resulting from market liber-
alization.  These policies might include higher budget
subsidies to the agricultural sector, greater state control
over prices (for both inputs and output), which would
be set to agricultural producers’ advantage, and more
trade restrictions.18 Such policies, though, would be
wholly inconsistent with market reform.  Any resulting
rise in output would therefore be a measure not of the
progress of reform but of its negation.  Thus, the main
reason output is a flawed indicator of reform progress
in agriculture is that one could not easily determine
whether any growth was the result of effective market-
consistent reform policies or anti-reform policies.
One might argue that production could be stimulated
by higher GDP growth that raised consumer income,
thereby boosting demand for foodstuffs.  Higher
demand for food would increase prices for producers,
thereby motivating more output.   Some high-level
officials in transition economies have argued that
demand-stimulating GDP growth is agriculture’s best
hope for an output rebound.
This argument holds, however, only for countries
largely insulated from the world market. As men-
tioned earlier in this report, if a country is generally
free-trading and its domestic market is well-integrated
into the world market, world prices determine its
domestic prices, independent of the level of domestic
demand. If a country were a net importer of a certain
foodstuff, an increase in domestic demand for the
good from growing consumer income would be satis-
fied by additional imports, not additional domestic
production. If a country were a net exporter of the
good, higher consumer demand would reduce exports,
leaving domestic output unchanged. This effect can be
seen in figure 4, where we assume again that a coun-
try is facing world price P2 for a good and importing
Q1Q4.  A shift to the right of the demand curve
increases domestic consumption and imports, but not
domestic production.
The main way to raise agricultural output consistent
with a market-driven and free-trading economy would
be through positive supply-side developments. Two
such developments are possible: effective farm-level
changes, of the type imagined by the forecasting stud-
ies examined earlier, that increase productivity; and
more vigorous development of both commercial and
public infrastructure and institutions that a market-
driven agricultural economy needs.
Farm-level changes could spur productivity growth in
three general ways. The first way would be simply to
shed unproductive inputs, particularly labor.  The agri-
cultural labor force in virtually all transition economies
is inefficiently large, as shown by the fact that agricul-
ture’s share in the total labor force is much higher than
agriculture’s share in GDP. In most countries, primary
agriculture accounts for 15-30 percent of the total labor
force (compared with only 2 percent in the United
States and about 5 percent in the EU), while agricul-
ture’s share in GDP is about 10-20 percent.
This form of agricultural productivity growth—excess
labor moving out of agriculture to new employment—
expands output not in agriculture, but in the industries
to which the labor moves.  Unlike with the two other
ways of increasing productivity that will be discussed,
agriculture itself does not receive a production boost.
Shedding excess labor has the advantage that produc-
tivity can rise in agriculture without necessarily hav-
ing to change the nature and system of farm-level
production. The transfer of labor to off-farm employ-
ment, however, requires reform developments outside
18 Most transition economies have not wholly eliminated subsidies
or state controls over prices and trade.  Most, however, are closer
to the free market and trade scenario depicted in figure 4 than to
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of agriculture, that is, the generation of new nonagricul-
tural jobs. In the transition context, this would come
from economy-wide liberalization, particularly in serv-
ices, which quickly creates new employment opportuni-
ties. Macours and Swinnen (forthcoming) find that
economy-wide liberalization is positively correlated
with the growth of labor productivity in agriculture.
Concern that discarded low-skilled labor might be
unable to find new jobs has been a major obstacle to
systemic reform in transition agriculture.19
The second way farm-level changes could raise pro-
ductivity would be for less productive farms to rise
to the productivity and efficiency level of the current
top-performing farms in their country. This improve-
ment in technical efficiency by farms moving closer
to the production practices of their country’s best
farms is also achievable within a country’s existing
production technology. One way farms could
increase usable output in this manner would be to
reduce the tremendous waste of harvested output
during the stages of storage, transportation, and pro-
cessing, a systemic weakness inherited from the pre-
reform period (Johnson, 1993). This would raise pro-
ductivity and efficiency measured from the point of
view of the entire agro-food economy.
The third way farm-level changes could increase pro-
ductivity would be to adopt new technologies of pro-
duction (technological change). The new “technol-
ogy” could involve improvement not only in the tech-
nical means of production, but also in the way farms
are organized, managed, and motivated. For example,
Macours and Swinnen (forthcoming) find that the cre-
ation of user rights for farmland is positively corre-
lated with growth in agricultural labor productivity (as
well as with growth in output). User rights motivate
productivity growth by providing farmers security of
tenure in their land (if not strictly as owners, at least
as users), thereby improving farmers’ incentives to
work efficiently and invest in their farms. Foreign
direct investment could play a key role in transferring
both superior technology and management practices
to transition agriculture.
The other major supply-side development that could
increase support would be to improve both the com-
mercial and public institutional infrastructure that a
market-driven agricultural economy requires. As dis-
cussed earlier in this report, major institutional needs
include well-operating systems of market information,
rural banking and finance, and commercial law. By
lowering transaction costs, such infrastructural serv-
ices would make domestic agricultural output more
price competitive vis-à-vis the world market (which
for many countries means competing with imports sold
in their large cities). In figure 4, the drop in transaction
costs would shift the supply curve to the right, stimu-
lating output and improving the trade balance of the
good in question.
Lerman (1999, 2000) finds that a correlation exists
between GDP growth in transition economies and
growth in agricultural output.  GDP growth not only
increases the quantity of agricultural inputs (includ-
ing physical capital) available to farms, but also
results in development of the agricultural services
and commercial infrastructure that farms need to
function and reduces operational and transaction
costs. Thus, the success of economy-wide reform and
growth appears to be a key factor in the prosperity
and growth of agriculture.
Another simulation scenario in the ERS study on
restructuring in the livestock sector (Cochrane, 2002)
examines the effect on livestock herds and production
from a decrease in transaction costs resulting from
accelerated development of institutional market infra-
structure. Institutional development is assumed to
reduce transaction costs (represented in the study by
marketing margins) by 20 percent in Russia, Ukraine,
and Romania. The projected effect is substantial, as
both herds and meat output rise 5-20 percent (depend-
ing on the country and type of meat).
It was mentioned earlier in the report that Western
forecasting studies omitted the role of institutions and
commercial infrastructure in predicting how reform
might change the volume and mix of transition
economies’ agricultural production, consumption, and
trade (perhaps because these elements are not easily
quantifiable). Yet, Western aid has far from ignored the
19 One of the simulation scenarios in the ERS study on restructur-
ing in transition economies’ livestock sector (Cochrane, 2002)
examines the effect on employment, production, and trade from the
movement of labor out of the sector to nonagricultural jobs.  In the
simulation, investment in nonagricultural sectors in Poland, Roma-
nia, and Russia is assumed to rise 15 percent, which by increasing
wages draws labor from agriculture.  As expected, output in the
sectors receiving the investment rises while livestock production
falls, which in turn increases imports of livestock goods.  The main
conclusion of the scenario is that in order for a significant amount
of labor to be enticed to nonagricultural employment, wages must
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importance of institutions and market infrastructure in
the reform of transition agriculture.  Much of the
West’s technical assistance effort vis-à-vis transition
agriculture, as indicated by the efforts of the World
Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment, has focused on building such infrastructure.
Nonetheless, it seems fair to conclude that at the start
of reform, Western specialists underrated how slow
and difficult the creation of this infrastructure would
be, as well as how crucial it is for the functioning of a
market-based agricultural system.  A recent World
Bank report on poverty (World Bank, 2000) asserts
that in formulating policies to combat poverty in
developing and transition economies, as well as in
helping devise social and economic policy in general,
international aid organizations have paid insufficient
attention to institutions.
The creation and effective operation of market-based
institutions in the transition economies take time.
Western technical assistance in this area should focus
on education and training. While it is important that
personnel in the transition economies master the tech-
nical administration of new institutions, it is equally
important that public officials, as well as those whom
the institutions should serve, understand why the insti-
tutions are important within the framework of a market
system, and trust and respect them, particularly when
their own interests conflict with maintaining the insti-
tutions’ integrity.  The ability of people to change their
behavior in this way is a major constraint on the pace
and effectiveness of reform.
The two main ways the transition economies can
increase agricultural output compatible with market
reform—effective farm-level changes and building of
supporting institutional infrastructure—create that
additional output by either raising productivity or low-
ering costs (both the primary costs of production and
transaction costs).  In fact, productivity growth and
cost reduction are opposite sides of the same coin.
Productivity growth allows a given level of output to
be produced using fewer inputs than before, thereby
lowering unit costs of production.  Since productivity
growth is the means to the end of market-compatible
growth in output, it is a more primal performance indi-
cator of reform success than output.
As mentioned earlier, productivity growth within an
industry can result in transferring resources to pro-
duce more goods in other parts of the economy.  In
the transition economies, resources will move to those
industries producing goods that consumers now wish
to buy but were unavailable (or provided in insuffi-
cient quantity) under the planned economy.  Many
goods and, especially, services that have been com-
mon in the West were completely unavailable to con-
sumers in the pre-reform period.  Therefore, another
reason productivity growth is superior to output
growth as a performance indicator for a particular
industry is that the effect of a rise in productivity
might not be to increase output in that industry.
Rather, its effect might be to allow resources to be
shifted to producing other goods that are either more
desired by domestic consumers (particularly as tastes
change), or are more competitive on the world market.
Productivity growth has the benefit of raising a coun-
try’s production capacity while providing flexibility as
to how the country uses the increased capacity.
Measuring Productivity Growth
The single best measure of productivity growth, not
only for transition economies but for economies in
general, is total factor productivity (TFP) growth.
TFP growth for a good is an aggregate measure that
captures the growth in productivity of all inputs used
in production.20
Productivity growth can also be measured for each
specific input used in production.  However, the analy-
sis of productivity growth for individual inputs must
be handled with care, particularly with transition
economies.  During transition, the measured productiv-
ity of agricultural intermediate inputs, such as fertil-
izer, fuel, and machinery, has risen, in many cases sub-
stantially.  On the other hand, the productivity of labor
and land (as measured by yields) in general has
dropped.  The main reason for these developments is
not that major changes have been made in the system
of production that make intermediate inputs more pro-
ductive and labor and land less so.  Rather, the large
increase in real prices for agricultural intermediate
inputs following price liberalization has caused the use
of these inputs by farms to fall to a greater degree than
output.  Measured productivity for these more scarcely
used inputs has thereby increased.  The amount of
labor and land used in agriculture has also generally
declined, but by less than intermediate inputs.  The
20 More specifically, TFP growth is the weighted average of growth
in productivity of each individual input used in production, where the
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larger relative drop in intermediate inputs has therefore
reduced the average productivity of land and labor.
Some countries, such as Hungary and the Czech
Republic, are exceptions, in that their farms have man-
aged to shed enough labor such that labor productivity
has risen.
The fact that there is natural pressure within transition
economies for the productivity of agricultural labor
and land to drop (as just described) makes productivity
growth for these two inputs relatively more acceptable
as indicators of reform progress.  Any positive growth
in productivity of these inputs would come not from
changes in the relative mix of the inputs used in pro-
duction, but from an improvement in the way these
inputs are used in production.
The main disadvantage of growth in productivity, as
opposed to output, as a performance indicator is that
productivity changes are more difficult to compute,
especially in terms of data requirements.  Although
calculating productivity growth for individual inputs is
fairly straightforward, and the required data are gener-
ally available, computing changes in TFP is much
more challenging.  The necessary data most difficult to
obtain are the shares of each input in the total value of
output.  Because of the challenges involved, the
research community has yet to provide anything close
to a complete set of TFP calculations for transition
agriculture.
Agricultural Productivity Performance
Differs Among Transition Economies
In general, agricultural productivity growth in the tran-
sition economies during the 1990s was disappointing,
particularly in light of the expectations many had at
the beginning of reform.  A detailed examination of
why productivity growth was lower than expected, and
why some countries have done better than others, is
beyond the scope of this report.  Only a brief discus-
sion will be provided.  Because of the challenges of
computing agricultural productivity growth, especially
that of TFP, the “hard” empirical evidence one can use
in a productivity assessment is only fragmentary.  The
following discussion is based not only on this hard
evidence, but also on more anecdotal information.
The best productivity performers appear to be Hungary
and the Czech Republic.  Macours and Swinnen
(2000a) compute that during the first half of the 1990s,
these countries had the best TFP performance in crop
production among the CEECs.  The superior perform-
ance, though, was strictly relative, because TFP grew
over the 5-year period in the two countries by only 10-
20 percent (total, not annual).  Hungary and the Czech
Republic, however, enjoyed a large increase in agricul-
tural labor productivity during the 1990s, far above
that of other transition economies (fig. 6).
As discussed earlier, the World Bank grades the agri-
cultural reform effort in the 26 transition economies
based on five elements: price and market liberaliza-
tion, land reform and privatization, privatization and
reform of agroprocessing and input supply enterprises,
rural finance, and institutional reform (Csaki and
Nash, 2000).   Scores on these indicators should gener-
ally be correlated with productivity growth, and for
some indicators, such as land reform and privatization,
the correlation should be close.
Out of a maximum possible score of 10, Hungary and
the Czech Republic receive the highest scores of 8.8
and 8.6, respectively.  The large socialist-era farms in
these two countries have turned into private, large-
scale corporate enterprises.  It appears that labor pro-
ductivity has risen mainly because a major systemic
restructuring of these farms induced them to shed sub-
stantial amounts of labor.  This has been made possi-
ble by (relatively) successful economy-wide reform
that generates jobs outside of agriculture (Macours and
Swinnen, forthcoming) and helps finance and maintain
an effective social welfare system that provides pen-
sions and unemployment benefits for urban residents.
High foreign direct investment (compared to other
transition economies; OECD, 1999), in both agricul-
ture and economy-wide, has also helped motivate this
labor migration. Investment within agriculture facili-
tates labor-saving productivity growth, while invest-
ment in the rest of the economy creates new jobs out-
side of agriculture.
Productivity growth has been lower in the other
CEECs, such as Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania.
These countries also score lower than Hungary and the
Czech Republic in the World Bank agricultural reform
ranking. (The scores are 7.8 for Poland, 7.6 for Bul-
garia, and 6.6 for Romania.)  Some countries, such as
Poland and the Baltic States, have implemented major
farm-level reforms, such as creating land markets and
full user rights in land. Certain of these countries,
however, have also moved to a system of small private
farms. (Poland already had small household farms at
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incentives to work and invest.  On the other hand, the
small farms in these countries appear to suffer from
diseconomies of scale, as well as underutilized labor.
Small household farms absorb surplus labor from the
rest of the economy. Labor is also drawn to household
farms because they often function as a more effective
social safety net than national welfare systems, which
are less well organized and generous in these countries
than in Hungary and the Czech Republic.
With so little land on these farms for each household
to work, the productivity of labor suffers. Poland and
Romania had low declines in aggregate agricultural
production during the 1990s (less than 10 percent) rel-
ative to most other transition economies (table 1). The
main reason is not better productivity performance but
greater labor employment. During the 1990s, agricul-
ture’s share in Poland’s labor force was 20 percent or
more, while agriculture’s share in Romania rose from
28 to 36 percent. Output levels were maintained at the
expense of low labor productivity.
In affecting farm performance, the diseconomies of
scale of small private farms can negate much of the
benefit arising from strong incentives to work and
invest. In fact, Lerman (2000) finds no conclusive evi-
dence for the CEECs or NIS that farm size alone is
correlated with productivity—neither large nor small
farms are necessarily more productive than the other.21
The NIS countries generally have had the poorest
productivity performance. Lerman et al. (2001) find
that from 1992 to 1997, Russia had TFP growth of
about 7 percent, and Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus
had TFP growth of only 2-3 percent. Not surpris-
ingly, these countries also score low in the World
Bank agricultural reform ranking. (Scores were 5.6
for Russia, 5.4 for Ukraine, and 1.8 for Belarus.) In
most NIS countries, the former large state and collec-
tive farms continue to dominate production. Reform
21 Mathijs and Swinnen (2001) find that in the former East Ger-
many during the first half of the 1990s, medium-size partnership
farms (about 400-500 hectares) were more efficient producers than
either family farms or large former state and collective farms. Part-
nerships and family farms both had better technical efficiency than
former state and collective farms, presumably because of superior
incentives to use labor well, while partnerships enjoyed economies
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Just as productivity growth in a particular industry
might not necessarily result in a rise in output in
that industry, productivity growth might also affect
trade differently than one might at first think. This
point will be discussed specifically with respect to
the grain trade of the NIS countries. Earlier in this
report, it was explained that the fears of Western
agribusiness that reform might turn the NIS region
into a major grain exporter have not been realized.
This is largely because reform has not generated
the productivity increases that would result in large
surplus production. However, even if reform suc-
ceeded in raising productivity in grain production,
this effect might be insufficient to move the region
toward grain exports.
During the last few years, the NIS region has been
neither a big importer nor exporter of grain, the
annual trade balance for the region being just a few
million metric tons of either imports or exports.
The isolated effect of productivity growth in grain
would probably be to improve the trade balance in
the product. Productivity growth would stimulate
exports by reducing per unit costs of production,
thereby making domestic output more price com-
petitive vis-à-vis imports and the world market—in
other words, productivity growth would improve a
country’s comparative advantage in the product.
Assume, though, that productivity grows uniformly
throughout the region (for all inputs used to pro-
duce all goods), say by 50 percent. Because of the
inverse relationship between productivity growth
and costs of production, production costs for all
goods would fall also by a uniform percentage.
(Under standard assumptions, the per unit costs
would drop by one-third.) Since comparative
advantage depends on relative costs and prices, the
region’s structure of comparative advantage would
not change. If the region were a relatively high-cost
producer of a good before the uniform productivity
increase, it would remain a relatively high-cost pro-
ducer of the good, because per unit costs for all
goods would change by the same percentage. This
means that if the region were a net importer of a
good (say grain) before the productivity growth, it
would be economically profitable for the region to
continue importing the good.
This point can be reconciled with figure 4.  Assume
again that both the world and domestic price equal
P2 and the country in question is importing Q1Q4.
Economy-wide productivity growth would shift the
supply curve for the good in question to the right.
However, by lowering the production cost of all
goods by a uniform percentage, the productivity
rise should appreciate the country’s currency
(under standard assumptions by an amount equal to
the productivity growth). The appreciation would
lower the good’s world price expressed in domestic
currency, which means the domestic currency price
P2 would fall.  The drop in price would increase
domestic consumption and reduce domestic pro-
duction. Thus, the country’s import trade balance in
the good might change little. Liefert (1994) exam-
ines the relationship between productivity growth
and comparative advantage, particularly as applied
to transition agriculture.
The following example further illustrates the rela-
tionship between productivity growth and compara-
tive advantage. Ever since Great Britain repealed
the Corn Laws in the middle of the 19th century,
which opened the country up to free trade, it has
been a major importer of agricultural goods.  Over
the past 150 years, Britain has had significant pro-
ductivity growth in agriculture in absolute terms.
However, because productivity growth has occurred
throughout the economy, Britain remains a high-
cost producer of agricultural goods relative to other
goods it produces, and thereby continues to be a
large agricultural importer.
If the NIS region currently does not have a com-
parative advantage in grain, as appears to be the
case, it can develop a comparative advantage and
thereby become a major exporter only if produc-
tivity growth in grain production exceeds that in
most other sectors of the economy. The southern
half of the European part of the NIS region has
Productivity Growth and Comparative 
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of these large farms to date has been largely cosmetic.
Farms in these countries have been required officially
to privatize and reorganize, with many becoming joint-
stock companies owned by their managers and work-
ers or some form of cooperative. However, little has
been done to change the farms’ internal systems of
organization, management, or incentives for workers.
Economy-wide reform has been slower in the NIS
countries than in most of the CEECs, thereby limiting
both the potential for farm labor to move to off-farm
employment and the availability of capital investment
for farms (capital replacing labor). Also, foreign
direct investment in the agro-food sector, which
could bring technology transfer, has been slight.
highly favorable natural conditions for agriculture,
particularly grain production—excellent soil and
climate  and generally adequate (though inconsis-
tent) precipitation. Once that region, which covers
Ukraine and southern European Russia, adopts
world-standard production technology, creates rea-
sonably efficient systems of farm organization and
management, and builds institutional infrastructure
to service agriculture properly, it will most likely
have a comparative advantage in production of
grain and various other crops, such that it should
be a major exporter. This effect would be consis-
tent with the region’s history of being a large grain
exporter.  However, agriculture has been one of the
most conservative and anti-reform sectors in the
NIS economies during the transition period and
gives little indication of becoming significantly
more progressive during the next 10-15 years.
Thus, during at least this timeframe, the likelihood
that agriculture will outperform the rest of the
economy in productivity growth to become a
major exporting sector appears dim. 
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Conclusion
Economic reform in the transition economies has
transformed the volume and mix of these countries’
agricultural production, consumption, and trade. The
main development has been a major drop in produc-
tion—ranging in most countries from 25 to 50 percent
for total agricultural output—with the livestock sector
being hit particularly hard.
The contraction in both the production and consump-
tion of foodstuffs is an inevitable part of market
reform. The main reason for the drop is that con-
sumers’ desires for goods have replaced those of plan-
ners and the political leadership as the dominant force
in determining what goods are produced and con-
sumed. The policies that engineered the switch from
planners’ to consumers’ preferences as the driving
force of production and consumption were price and
trade liberalization. These policies substantially
reduced the array of subsidies to agriculture that main-
tained artificially high levels of output.
The main effect of the commodity restructuring of
transition agriculture for U.S. agriculture is that the
region of the former USSR ceased being a major mar-
ket for grain and oilseeds (soybeans and soybean
meal), and instead has become a large market for U.S.
poultry (as well as for beef and pork, though not
mainly from the United States). In fact, during the sec-
ond half of the 1990s, nearly half of all U.S. poultry
exports went to Russia. These trade changes indicate
that the region has a comparative disadvantage in live-
stock products relative to crops—that is, the region
produces livestock goods at a relatively higher cost
than it produces animal feed and food crops.
The drop in food production and consumption has
raised concerns about food security in certain coun-
tries, such as Russia and other NIS countries. The food
security problem, however, is not the result of inade-
quate availability of food supplies. Before reform, the
transition economies had high per capita levels of con-
sumption of most foodstuffs, compared even to rich
countries of the West. Although consumption of
expensive livestock products has fallen, consumption
of staple foods such as bread and potatoes has
remained steady or even increased. Food insecurity has
grown because of insufficient access to food by seg-
ments of the population and regions within countries.
The growth in poverty has expanded the size of the
population that cannot afford a healthy diet, while
impediments to the internal flow of foodstuffs have
prevented deficit-producing regions from obtaining
food supplies.
That the fall in agricultural production has been a nec-
essary part of market reform shows that output is a
misleading indicator of reform progress. The absence
of a decline in output for a country more likely reflects
the failure to reform, rather than reform success. The
transition economies that have experienced the lowest
declines in agricultural output, such as Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan, have also been the least reformist.
A better performance indicator than output for transi-
tion agriculture is productivity growth. Productivity
growth will raise income in the sector, as well as close
the gap between agriculture’s share in the labor force
and its share in GDP. Also, the only way a country can
increase agricultural output consistent with a market-
driven, low-subsidy, and free-trading economy is to
raise productivity, which by lowering production costs
makes domestic output more price competitive on the
world market. Productivity growth has the added bene-
fit that the increase in productive capacity does not
have to be wholly realized in the industry in which the
productivity rise occurs. Rather, existing levels of out-
put can be maintained in that industry while resources
(such as labor) are shifted to producing other goods
that either are more desired by consumers or are more
competitive on the world market.
The restructuring of agricultural production, consump-
tion, and trade during transition that results from mar-
ket liberalization is the more “shortrun” side of agri-
cultural reform (which nonetheless can run for quite a
few years), as well as the side of reform that involves
hardship for the sector. Agricultural productivity
growth, and the systemic and policy changes that
would motivate the growth, represents the longer term,
more dynamic, and more optimistic side of reform,
through which the sector could achieve prosperity.
Productivity growth in the transition economies
involves changing not just the material technology of
production, but more importantly the nature and
behavior of farms—that is, how they are organized,
managed, and motivated (the system of incentives). A
necessary supplement to these farm-level changes is
creating the supporting commercial and public infra-
structure and institutions that a market-driven agricul-
tural system needs.  Such infrastructure involves, for
example, systems of credit, market information, and
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Whatever optimism existed in the West at the begin-
ning of the transition period concerning agricultural
reform in the transition economies was based on the
belief that these countries had the potential (including
the will) to make the farm-level changes and build the
institutional infrastructure that would allow them to
close the large agricultural productivity gap between
themselves and OECD countries. Based on existing
evidence, productivity growth to date in transition
agriculture has generally been disappointing. The more
progressive reformers in Central and Eastern Europe,
such as Hungary and the Czech Republic, have done
better than others. This conclusion is based on both
(limited) empirical measures of productivity and the
observed degree of policy and institutional change.
The NIS countries (which exclude the Baltic States)
have done poorly, with respect to both empirical
results and observed policy and institutional changes.
Poland is an example of a country that in terms of
overall economic reform has been a relatively fast and
successful reformer, but suffers from a large agricul-
tural workforce and a system of small household farms
that cannot exploit economies of scale.
If the goal of agricultural reform in the transition
economies is to create a profitable, market-driven agri-
cultural economy with productivity levels and support-
ing infrastructure that allow it to compete effectively
on the world market, the process in most countries is
far from complete, with the degree of progress to date
diminishing the farther one moves east. The agricul-
tural sector in the transition economies has already
endured a large part of the costs of economic reform.
That most of the benefits that would come from effec-
tive reform still remain to be captured can be a basis
for both frustration and optimism.30  Changes in Agricultural Markets in Transition Economies / AER-806 Economic Research Service/USDA
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